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Abstract
Background: Universal health coverage (UHC) is important in terms of improving access to quality health care
while protecting households from the risk of catastrophic health spending and impoverishment. However, progress
to UHC has been hampered by the measures to increase mandatory prepaid funds especially in low- and middle-
income countries where there are large populations in the informal sector. Important considerations in expanding
coverage to the informal sector should include an exploration of the type of prepayment system that is acceptable
to the informal sector and the features of such a design that would encourage prepayment for health care among
this population group. The objective of the study was to document the views of informal sector workers regarding
different prepayment mechanisms, and critically analyze key design features of a future health system and the
policy implications of financing UHC in Kenya.
Methods: This was part of larger study which involved a mixed-methods approach. The following tools were used
to collect data from informal sector workers: focus group discussions [N = 16 (rural = 7; urban = 9)], individual in-depth
interviews [N = 26 (rural = 14; urban = 12)] and a questionnaire survey [N = 455(rural = 129; urban = 326)]. Thematic
approach was used to analyze qualitative data while Stata v.11 involving mainly descriptive analysis was used in
quantitative data. The tools mentioned were used to collect data to meet various objectives of a larger study and
what is presented here constitutes a small section of the data generated by these tools.
Results: The findings show that informal sector workers in rural and urban areas prefer different prepayment
systems for financing UHC. Preference for a non-contributory system of financing UHC was particularly strong in the
urban study site (58%). Over 70% in the rural area preferred a contributory mechanism in financing UHC. The main
concern for informal sector workers regardless of the overall design of the financing approach to UHC included a
poor governance culture especially one that does not punish corruption. Other reasons especially with regard to the
contributory financing approach included high premium costs and inability to enforce contributions from
informal sector.
Conclusion: On average 47% of all study participants, the largest single majority, are in favor of a non-
contributory financing mechanism. Strong evidence from existing literature indicates difficulties in implementing social
contributions as the primary financing mechanism for UHC in contexts with large informal sector populations. Non-
contributory financing should be strongly recommended to policymakers to be the primary financing mechanism and
supplemented by social contributions.
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Background
Since the 58th World Health Assembly, many low- and-
middle-income countries (LMICs) are reforming their
health systems for universal health coverage (UHC).
UHC has two key goals: financial risk protection and ac-
cess to needed care. Implicit are objectives related to
equity, quality of services and broader social protection
[1]. The World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mends greater use of mandatory prepayment mecha-
nisms including general government revenue (tax
funding) and social health insurance (SHI). Both tax
funding and SHI can mobilise substantial resources, cre-
ate income and risk cross-subsidies and benefit from
economies of scale. Large risk pools are more financially
secure and promote equity in financing and access to
health care across socio-economic groups [2, 3].
The need for UHC is well documented. However, the
measures to increase mandatory prepaid funds to pro-
gress toward UHC are faced with a number of challenges
including inefficiencies in revenue collection and use of
health resources, inequitable access and utilisation of
health services and large populations working in the in-
formal sector [4–6].
The ILO & WTO [7] indicates that up to 65% of the
total population in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) work in the informal sector. In Kenya, informal
sector workers constitute about 80% of the total work-
force [8, 9]. The sector is characterized by low and
irregular incomes which make prepaying for health care
difficult. As a result, existing prepayment systems in-
cluding funding from government revenue and premium
contributions in Kenya and many LMIC tend to exclude
informal sector workers because either the funds are in-
adequate (in the case of funding from general govern-
ment revenue) or they are too poor to pay for insurance
premiums [3]. Moreover SHI schemes historically have
focused on the formal sector workers because it is rela-
tively easy by law to enforce mandatory contributions
through salary deductions [3, 5].
A number of developing countries are reforming their
health systems for UHC. In Kenya, financing reforms for
UHC are underway and the process of finalizing a health
financing strategy (HFS) has been going on for more
than two years. The draft HFS proposes a contributory
health insurance model as the main health financing
strategy for Kenya where both formal and informal sec-
tor workers contribute premiums to a scheme, and the
government subsidizes premiums for the poor and other
vulnerable groups.
The contributory policy approach to financing UHC in
Kenya is a technocrat-led top-down strategy with limited
public participation and partly informed by the assump-
tion that there are sufficient financial resources in the
informal sector to support the UHC agenda. There is
limited evidence to suggest that the views of informal
sector workers regarding their preferred prepayment de-
sign were put into consideration. Thornton et al. [10] re-
iterate the scarcity of evidence on the best possible
design of a prepayment system that targets the informal
sector in terms of ability to achieve high coverage or to
increase utilisation of quality health services across dif-
ferent contexts. Extending coverage to the informal sec-
tor through an inclusive process increases their
participation in decision-making processes and break
away from exclusion [11, 12], for example from prepay-
ment systems. This study fills this gap in evidence by ex-
ploring informal sector workers’ preference of health
financing mechanisms for UHC. It presents the views of
informal sector workers on the design of future prepay-
ment mechanisms and how such a design could drive up
an all-inclusive population coverage in Kenya. The aim
of this paper is to illustrate the preferences of the infor-
mal sector in designing a prepayment mechanism with
the aim of expanding population and service coverage to
achieve UHC.
Methods
Data presented in this paper were part of a larger study
whose aim was to contribute to national and inter-
national policy debates on UHC in contexts with large
informal sector populations. The study was conducted in
two counties: Nyeri, a rural county that relies predomin-
antly on agriculture; and Mombasa, the second largest
city in Kenya. The combination of an urban and a rural
county provided an opportunity to compare and contrast
the views of agricultural and non-agricultural informal
workers. In addition, existing studies on the informal
sector in Kenya including [13–15], have all been con-
ducted in Nairobi, the largest urban setting in Kenya.
Nyeri County was purposively selected based on the fact
that it has a long history of community based health in-
surance (CBHI) schemes. There was clear indication that
the population was potentially aware of health insurance
issues and hence their insights and experiences were im-
portant for this study, particularly in relation to explor-
ing alternative prepayment mechanisms.
A stratified five-stage and four-stage sample designs
were applied in the rural and urban sites respectively, to
arrive at primary sampling units (PSU) (Figs. 1 & 2).
Expert opinion was used to select areas where informal
sector entities were most active.
The rural site was stratified along existing administra-
tive zones comprising of divisions, locations and villages.
The village, as the smallest sampling unit, was selected
as the Enumeration Area (EA). Since the divisions were
on the whole, homogenously engaged in subsistence
agriculture, one division with a large market was
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purposively selected to obtain a mix of the agricultural
and non-agricultural informal sector activities in rural
areas. From this division, a list of locations and villages
were selected from which economic entities were
mapped and randomly selected. Households represented
economic units (farms) in the agricultural informal sec-
tor. The owners or managers working within the agricul-
tural informal sector were interviewed at home except
for the few who were found at the farms and preferred
to be interviewed on site.
In the urban site, a list of estates was obtained from
the town authorities. The estates including the central
business district (CBD) constituted four purposively se-
lected enumeration areas (EAs) for the urban area. The
four EAs were selected because they had the largest con-
centration of informal sector entities and so provided
the best opportunity to capture a large diversity in the
type and size of informal sector entities. From the four
urban EAs, a list of locations was obtained from which
economic entities were mapped and randomly selected.
A representative sample size for quantitative compo-
nent of the study was calculated using the following for-
mula (+30% to account for non-response):
N ¼ Zcritð Þ
2p 1−pð Þ
D2
¼ 499 ≈ 500ð Þ economic entities
-where N represented the sample size of the study
group, the Zcrit value is = 1.96, p (=0.5) is based on pre-
vious studies [16] and represents the pre-study estimate
of the proportion to be measured (that is, the proportion
of informal sector entities that have financial potential to
prepay for health care) and D (=0.05) is the total width
of the expected confidence interval (CI). The urban sam-
ple consisted of 350 economic entities and 150 for the
rural area. The allocation was based on a mapping of in-
formal sector entities which showed that for every infor-
mal sector entity in the rural site, there were about 2.3
entities in the urban site.
For the qualitative component, a conservative estimate
was given as 12 focus group discussions (FGDs) strati-
fied by gender, 17 key informant interviews at commu-
nity level and five policy level in-depth interviews.
Purposive and snow-balling sampling strategies were
used to collect the qualitative data from key informants.
Data were collected to saturation.
Phase 1 of data collection involved mapping informal
sector entities in terms of geographical location and types
of entities (N = 2721). Phase 2 included FGDs and in-
depth interviews (IDIs). A total of 16 FGDs (Rural = 7,
Urban = 9) and 16 community level IDIs (Rural = 14,
Urban = 12 and Policy Level = 9) were conducted. Phase 3
was an interviewer administered questionnaire survey
which achieved 91% response rate [N = 455 out of 500;
Rural = 64 females, 65 males; Urban = 92 females, 234
males)]. The variety of data collection tools mentioned
above were used to collect data to meet various objectives
of the larger study and what is presented in this article
constitutes a small section of the data generated by these
tools. So not all the data generated from the large qualita-
tive study were relevant to this study. The broad topics ex-
plored that were relevant to this paper included design
Fig. 1 Five-stage sampling in the rural study site
Fig. 2 Four-stage sampling in the urban study site
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preferences of future prepayment system including choice
of a prepayment system, who should prepay for health
care and management of prepaid funds for health. In
particular, the study participants were asked what type of
prepayment system between contributory and non-
contributory mechanisms, they would prefer to be the
main financing approach if all Kenyans were to receive
quality health care under a universal coverage system. The
preference for a dominant financing mechanism was with
the knowledge that both contributory and non-
contributory mechanisms operate concurrently in many
health systems. The study participants were also asked to
discuss who should and who should not pay for health
care. The design of the benefit package was also discussed;
however, the description of the benefit package was
broadly presented as it is one that requires more technical
considerations beyond the views of informal sector
workers. Lastly, the study participants were asked to dis-
cuss how the management of a future prepaid system
could be made more transparent to avoid corruption. Key
issues raised from FGDs including choice of a prepayment
system and payment for health care, were further explored
with key informants.
Quantitative data were double-entered into prede-
signed data entry spread-sheets in FoxPro and trans-
ferred to Stata Version 11 for analysis. They were
categorised and grouped to give a summary of results
using descriptive statistics.
All qualitative data were audio recorded and translated
into English where necessary. Data were organised and
coded using QSR NVivo 7.0. Analysis was performed by
developing a matrix of emerging categories and themes.
Data from each theme or category was identified and
analysed using constant comparison [17]. Concepts and
themes identified from various qualitative data sources
were compared. The analytical categories were then ex-
plained and interpreted in line with the research objec-
tives and the themes developed from the data [18].
Results
To expand population coverage to its members, key de-
sign elements were preferred by informal sector workers
(See Additional files 1, 2 & 3 for tools used in data
collection).
Design element 1: Choice of financing mechanism
On average, 47% of the study participants, representing
the largest single majority, preferred a non-contributory
mechanism compared to 40% that preferred the contribu-
tory system. About 13% were indifferent (Fig. 3). There
were significant differences (P = <0.001) between urban
and rural study participants in their preferences for either
a contributory or non-contributory mechanism.
An overwhelming majority (73%) of the rural area in-
formal sector workers preferred a contributory financing
approach to UHC compared to 28% in the urban area.
The main reason given for their choice was familiarity
with contributory schemes. The majority of study partic-
ipants expressed knowledge of the NHIF and CBHI
schemes. An FGD participant said: “We are used to the
schemes and they are what we would like to provide
health care for all…” (Female FGD1, Rural). Another
participant added: “We have several questions regarding
a non-contributory system: how does it work? How will
we know how much is collected for health care? Who will
keep the money?” (Female FGD3, Rural).
Fig. 3 Preferred prepayment mechanisms by the informal sector
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The other reason closely related to first one is that
rural informal sector workers “know each other” which
to them makes managing contributions transparent and
regular. One FGD participant said: “It is important that
we have a local health scheme where members contribute
regularly because we know each other and those in
charge of managing the funds are from among oursel-
ves….so chances of mismanaging our funds are limited”
(Male FGD5, Rural).
Beyond familiarity with schemes, the theme of corrup-
tion was recurrent in all FGDs and key informant inter-
views in both urban and rural study sites. The general
feeling among informal sector workers was that any fi-
nancing mechanism that is controlled by the govern-
ment is a recipe for corruption. One key informant
observed: “We do not consider ourselves as a part of this
government…and so we cannot give it any more money
to keep under the pretence of providing free health care
because we will never get free health care or anything
from the government” (KI3, Urban). Although this infor-
mation may not be applicable in a different setting, it
highlights the importance of trust and the political con-
text in advancing population and service coverage
among informal sector populations.
As opposed to the rural area, more than half of the
urban population (58%) preferred a non-contributory
mechanism of financing health services. Study partici-
pants who favoured a non-contributory financing mech-
anism raised a number of reasons for their choice
including the ease of implementation and revenue col-
lection and low administrative costs. A key informant
observed: “We would like health care for all to be funded
by the government because taxes are much easier to col-
lect than insurance contributions. Only the law needs to
change, which does not cost much...” (Male KI7, Urban).
Concerns about sustainable financing also influenced
preference for a non-contributory system over a con-
tributory mechanism. This featured strongly in nine of
the 12 FGDs and 14 KI interviews with most study
participants stating that under a predominantly non-
contributory mechanism, chances of defaulting in
payment or dropping out of coverage are eliminated. A
key informant had this to say: “I would support a non-
contributory system because all the taxes will be going to
the government which will be expected to provide an
agreed upon package of care whether we pay or not pay
because it is already a deal…. But come to think of it, no
one can claim to drop out of a tax-funded system be-
cause money for health care will be based on taxes on
consumables, among others” (KI3, Urban). The statement
also indicates that with each citizen potentially paying
directly or indirectly for health care, there would be a
greater sense of entitlement to a given package of care
which would make the government more accountable.
The non-contributory financing mechanism was also
regarded by study participants as more politically sus-
tainable under existing circumstances in the country.
Study participants argued that with the sharp political
divisions current in the country, a non-contributory
mechanism would be more acceptable and sustainable
financing option as it would not emphasise the low
levels of national integration; i.e. there would be no in-
formation regarding which county or region has contrib-
uted how much for health care. A participant explained:
“…. There are rich counties and very poor counties and
these may not like each other for purely political and
ethnic reasons. If people are going to be told that their
contributions could be used anywhere in the country, you
will see how politicians twist everything into a mess. So
to me a non-contributory approach would be the best
way forward” (Female, FGD1 Urban).
In addition, study participants reported that the non-
contributory approach was relatively affordable to infor-
mal sector workers and the poor because indirect taxes
are only payable upon consumption of certain goods and
services. In their argument on affordability, the partici-
pants indicated a measure of equity in financing through
tax-funded system. An FGD participant said: “In one
way or the other we all pay taxes directly or indirectly
and the more one buys the more one pays. So I think a
tax system will protect the poor who are likely to buy less
of the taxable items or services” (Male8, FGD Urban).
However, it is known that indirect taxes can be inequit-
able, particularly in high-income settings.
Informal sector workers opposed to either mechanism
were mainly concerned with corruption in government
and indicated that they would rather pay for health care
out-of-pocket to avoid their money being embezzled.
Anxiety over mismanagement of funds, distrust in the
ability of the government to deliver on the agreed pack-
age of care and affordability of premiums were some of
the key issues reported as potential barriers to the devel-
opment of prepaid health care and UHC in Kenya.
Opinions were sought about the specific design fea-
tures of the financing mechanisms including revenue
collection and pooling arrangements and payment strat-
egies. Regarding revenue collection, most study partici-
pants stated that revenue collection should involve easy
means of prepayment including devolved payment units
and use of wireless technology such as mobile phones
and internet.
Figure 4 illustrates the preferred premium payment
strategies as proposed by informal sector workers.
Results show significant differences in preferred payment
methods between rural and urban areas (P = 0.02).
Rural participants preferred premium payment methods
and devolved agency payment model using small scale in-
formal businesses as agents for the insurance agency
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(27%) and through savings and other informal community
groups (22%). In the urban area, use of mobile telephony,
savings and other informal community groups were the
most preferred (38% and 17%) respectively. Overall, use of
mobile telephony to pay premiums was most popular
(34%) followed by savings and other informal groups
(18%). About 54% of informal sector workers preferred to
pay their contributions on monthly basis; 19% preferred
annual contributions, and 27% preferred flexible payment
terms which would enable them to pay small instalments
towards their monthly targets. The varying choices on the
frequency of payment of premiums under a potential
contributory financing mechanism, to a great extent,
mirrors income inequalities in the informal sector in
the sense that those who can afford to pay yearly
lump-sum are those who are relatively well-off
compared to those who would like to pay in small
instalments spread over a month.
Design element 2: Population and cost coverage- who
gets covered, who pays?
Quantitative findings (Figs. 5 and 6) indicated the desire
by most study participants in both sites for the govern-
ment to pay for health care for everyone as a matter of
priority. In Fig. 5, about 73% in the urban area sup-
ported such an initiative compared to 55% in the rural
area. For the rural area, lower enthusiasm for govern-
ment intervention were linked to their familiarity with a
contributory mechanism and had expressed support for
the same over a non-contributory arrangement.
The rural area also showed higher support (about
35%) for a mix of funding involving the government and
Fig. 4 The most preferred premium payment methods (%)
Fig. 5 Who should pay for health care?
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individuals who can afford to pay compared to about
19% in the urban area who had a similar view. About 9%
from both study sites agreed that everyone should pay
for health care, which suggests no concern for those
who cannot afford to pay. The differences between rural
and urban areas in the choices regarding who should
pay for health were significant (P = 0.001).
The concern for people who cannot afford to pay for
health care is clearly demonstrated in Fig. 6 where 38%
overall (rural = 31% and urban = 45%) agreed that the
very poor should not pay for health care.
The results also indicate that other groups who should
possibly be exempted from paying for health care in-
clude the disabled, children and the elderly. However,
pregnant women received the least support from those
to be excluded (rural =0.8% and urban = 7.6%). This was
because any pregnant woman who is unable to pay for
health care would be poor and the poor are already pro-
posed for exemption. Similar findings were expressed in
the qualitative component of the study where there was
strong support for full subsidies for those who are too
poor to pay. This was expressed in the following state-
ment: “For me, any Kenyan who cannot pay for health
care because they are poor should be supported to get the
care that they need…it is that simple…” (KI3, rural).
For most study participants particularly in the urban
area, the government should be the one paying for health
care for everyone, arguing that the amount of money inef-
ficiently used every day is enough to provide health care
for all. These are illustrated in the following sentiments:
1. “Every day in the media, you hear a lot of stories
about government ministers and senior officials
stealing money. If this rampant theft is stopped the
government will save enough money to pay for health
care for all of us in this country” (KI11, Urban)
2. “Everyone is hungry in this country but not people
such as the ones employed to manage our funds….
Between a government officer and me, a hungry
man, who should steal from whom? It happens the
opposite way so we can never pay any money to the
government” (KI7, Urban).
Asked whether they were aware that government
funding of health care for all would mean increased
taxes, the general feeling was that such taxes had to be
quite minimal and increases should be implemented
only after the government implements governance mea-
sures such as efficient use of resources and eliminating
corruption from the public sector.
Study participants were categorical that given the pol-
itical context, it would be quite difficult to implement a
contributory financing system for UHC. This was
expressed in three FGDs in the urban site. Participants
argued that sharp political divisions current in the coun-
try could make a national contributory scheme difficult
to implement because of the seemingly low levels of na-
tional integration. A participant explained: “I am a
Kenyan; I was born here and know this country very well.
There are rich counties and very poor counties and these
may not like each other for purely political and ethnic
reasons. If people are going to be told that their contribu-
tions could be used anywhere in the country, you will see
how politicians twist everything into a mess. So to me a
predominantly tax-based system would the best way
forward” (Female, FGD1 Urban).
Design element 3: Benefit package
As shown in Table 1, four scenarios were presented to
study participants during the survey in which they were
asked to choose one scenario that they felt was most ap-
propriate and affordable for them.
Fig. 6 Who should not pay for health care?
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Table 1 shows that 46% of informal sector workers
would prefer tax increases or the proposed NHIF pre-
mium rate of KSh 500 per month if that would accord
them access to needed outpatient and inpatient services
at public sector health facilities. However, the majority
(51%) of those who preferred such an option were in the
urban area compared to 35% in the rural area. The likely
reason is that urban informal sector workers are eco-
nomically better off than their rural counterparts as
shown in findings elsewhere in the larger study. About
31% in total would stick with an inferior benefit package
not because it meets their health needs but most likely
they cannot afford other options. The differences in the
choices of the benefits package between the two study
sites were statistically insignificant (P = 0.91).
Design element 4: Accountability measures in the
management of prepaid funds
The possibility of mismanagement of funds for UHC
was one of the major concerns among informal sector
workers who would want to prepay for health care. From
mainly focus group discussions, the areas that needed
improvement in terms of managing a prepaid health sys-
tem included the following: the type of institution to
manage the funds and how the head of such an institu-
tion is appointed as well as transparency particularly
with financial information.
These critical areas for transparency, according to in-
formal sector workers, were followed up in the survey.
In terms of preferred institution to manage prepaid
funds, there were significant differences between urban
and rural study sites (P = <0.001). In Table 2, the rural
area preferred, by about 56%, that the institution to
manage prepaid funds should be semi-autonomous (part
government-part private) such as the NHIF. On the
other hand, the single largest group in the urban area
(about 41%) preferred the government to fully manage
such an institution compared to 30% of the rural informal
sector that preferred management by the government.
The least preferred institutions for each site were a private
entity in the rural area (14%) and a semi-autonomous
state organ in the urban area (24%). Overall for both study
sites, the national government was the most preferred in-
stitution (38%) to manage prepaid funds followed by a pri-
vate entity (29%). Considering the two most preferred
institutions in order of priority for each study site, the
rural area preferred a semi-autonomous organ and the na-
tional government and the urban preferred the national
government and a private institution.
Discussion
At least on average, the majority of informal sector
workers prefer a non-contributory financing design as
the dominant financing strategy for UHC. However, an
overwhelming majority of rural informal sector workers
is in support of the contributory system as the dominant
approach. The Government of Kenya has stated its de-
sire to expand coverage through social insurance contri-
butions which seems to be the financing strategy of
choice for the rural area but not for the urban area. Des-
pite the differences in the choice of the dominant finan-
cing strategy for UHC, both rural and urban study
participants expressed high levels of mistrust towards
the government. Fears of mismanagement of funds as
well as political interference and divisions, were
highlighted as potential bottlenecks in designing and de-
veloping effective prepayment mechanisms for UHC.
Despite the stated bottlenecks, there were strong justi-
fications for a non-contributory financing mechanism to
be the main financing approach for UHC. The reasons
put forward included the fact that such a system, com-
pared to social insurance contributions, would be more
equitable, affordable, easy to implement and sustainable.
Such a system was also viewed as inclusive hence elimin-
ation of such issues as defaulting payment and dropping
out of coverage, meaning that fund flows are likely to be
predictable to support UHC. A number of authors [2, 3,
19, 20] have expressed similar views and are supportive
of financing UHC through a non-contributory mechan-
ism in contexts with large informal sector populations.
The inclusivity of a non-contributory financing strat-
egy embodies institutional universalism which makes
Table 1 Broad design of a benefits package
Choice of scenarios Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%)
Scenario 1: Status quo with current NHIF
rates for comprehensive inpatient care at
public facilities only
63 (48.8) 75 (23.2) 138 (30.5)
Scenario 2: Comprehensive coverage
for outpatient and inpatient services in
public sector health facilities but with
increased prepayment either at
proposed NHIF rates (KSh 500 per
month) or increased taxes
45 (34.9) 165 (50.9) 210 (46.4)
Scenario 3: Choice to use private health
facilities but pay most of the bill out-of-
pocket or from a private insurance
arrangement
10 (7.6) 71 (21.9) 85 (17.9)
Scenario 4: None of the above 11(8.5) 13(4.0) 24 (5.3)
Total 129 (100) 324 (100) 453 (100)
Table 2 Most preferred institution to manage prepaid funds for
universal coverage
Type of institution Rural (%) Urban (%) Total (%)
Government 39 (30.2) 133 (40.8) 172 (37.8)
Private institution 18 (14.0) 115 (35.3) 133 (29.2)
Semi-autonomous state organ 72 (55.8) 78 (24.0) 150 (33.0)
Total 129 (100) 326 (100) 455 (100)
Pearson chi2 (45.60); P = <0.001
Bold data signifies differences between urban and rural sites in their preferences
for an institution to manage prepaid funds
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the redistribution process more effective than under a
contributory system where population coverage is often
gradual beginning with the formal sector. McIntyre [21]
and Sachs [22] state that institutional universalism
brings about entitlement to services on the basis of citi-
zenship as opposed to targeting. However, this entitle-
ment requires a high level of collective responsibility to
facilitate allocation and redistribution of resources to
ensure equitable and efficient delivery of services of the
same range and quality [23, 24].
An important observation in support for a non-
contributory approach to UHC focused on the political
economy of expanding coverage in a setting where social
cohesion is not strong and therefore the high degree of
collective responsibility required for effective redistribu-
tion is compromised. In such a setting, the findings indi-
cated, a non-contributory approach to UHC is less likely
to accentuate ethnic/regional division current in Kenya
where wealthier regions would find it difficult to partici-
pate in a redistributive platform. There is evidence that
UHC is a less likely scenario in societies with low social
solidarity including divisions along ethnic and religious
lines, and high income inequalities [25]. Social solidarity
is critical in sustaining redistributive policies such as
UHC [25, 26]. Without social solidarity, it is difficult to
implement policies that require popular support, par-
ticularly those that require certain resources from some
groups to support others. The political acceptability and
sustainability of a financing system for UHC needs to be
seriously considered in the design of future prepayment
system. However, there are some level of social and
political development in Kenya that could help in estab-
lishing UHC as a realistic political goal. The implemen-
tation of social welfare programmes such as free primary
care and free maternity health are important milestones
in the country’s quest for UHC. Stuckler et al. [25] ex-
plain that expansion of health care coverage normally
occurs as part of a broader process of increasing social
welfare programmes such as indicated.
The issue of affordability was a key factor in the design
preferences of a future prepaid health system. Afford-
ability is not simply having or not having money to
purchase health care but also the type of financing
mechanism as well as the timing of contributions if in a
contributory system. The non-contributory mechanism
was viewed as more affordable especially to the poor and
other low-income groups because they are not obligated
to pay if they do not fall within the taxable income
bracket or do not consume ‘vatable’ products.
For the contributory mechanism, there is substantial
evidence suggesting that many developing countries with
large informal sector populations that have attempted to
expand coverage through contributory mechanisms have
experienced difficulties. Tangcharoensathien et al. [27]
observe that implementing contributory schemes among
large informal sector populations is not feasible because
of the difficulties in collecting premiums and high ad-
ministrative costs. Although Rwanda has often been
given as a success story pursuing a contributory system,
the system is heavily donor dependent and questions
have been raised about its sustainability. For example,
enrolment to the mutuelles dropped from about 90% in
2012 to 79% in 2017 [28].
In terms of affordability, the contributory mechanism
may not be affordable to many low-income earners be-
cause contributions are either flat-rated [29] or the
structure/frequency of payments are unfavourable to
low-income groups. Kenya’s public insurer, the National
Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) has instituted reforms
allowing informal sector workers to pay their monthly
premiums in up to three instalments which could re-
solve some of the unfavourable terms of contributions.
The difficulty of prepaying yearly lump-sum premiums
has been recorded in Rwanda where timing of contribu-
tions coincided with other household obligations such as
school fees which together made yearly contribution ex-
pensive, leading to defaults in payments [30]. This
means that even among those who indicate that they
can afford yearly premiums there are those who will de-
fault because of other urgent household obligations. To
avoid such a scenario, a non-contributory approach to fi-
nancing UHC would be the most appropriate for a set-
ting such as Kenya.
In terms of management, the proposal for a semi-
autonomous entity and the national government by rural
and urban informal sector workers respectively, to man-
age a prepaid system, was somewhat surprising because
public sentiments largely perceive both the government
and the NHIF as corrupt and untrustworthy with public
funds. In the view of the researcher drawn from context-
ual experience, the choice of government and an entity
such as the NHIF were to some extent driven by com-
promise. For instance, the rural area had already indi-
cated their preference for a contributory system so an
institution moulded along the lines of the NHIF would
clearly be their choice because a private entity would
likely drive up costs. Likewise, the urban area, as demon-
strated earlier, strongly preferred a non-contributory sys-
tem so their choice of the government as the manager of
prepaid funds was not unexpected. There were however,
strong suggestions for accountability to ensure that the
management of funds for UHC remain transparent in-
cluding public declaration of financial statements, ser-
vice costs and service entitlement as well as measures
taken to prevent fraud.
Finally, drawing from the negative governance culture
as perceived by most informal sector workers, it would
be difficult to expand coverage whether under
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contributory or non-contributory approach. A number
of reports [31–33] suggesting financial impropriety in
the country are likely to make people reluctant to buy
into government programmes. In Ghana for example, re-
ports of widespread mismanagement of funds meant for
health care eroded trust and social solidarity to make
people reluctant to prepay for health care [34, 35].
Therefore, the suggestion by informal sector workers
that governance systems need to be more efficient in
controlling wastage and fraud need to be seriously con-
sidered as an important step toward raising revenues for
a non-contributory approach to financing UHC in many
LMIC. The European Union and the African Union [36]
joint report on social protection suggests that control-
ling corruption among other measures would improve
fiscal space to advance coverage for informal sector pop-
ulations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The WHO [1] has also
urged countries to effectively and efficiently use resources
at their disposal to facilitate progress towards universal
coverage.
Conclusion
There was a clear understanding among study partici-
pants of the concept of prepaying for health care and
why this is important. Why such clarity of information
about prepaying for health care had not translated into
actual prepayment participation by informal sector pop-
ulations was linked to several factors including the
choice of a prepayment mechanism which emphasises
premium payments and is difficult to enforce in law, as
well as a number of social, economic and political
factors that require interventions sometimes from out-
side the health system. The need for an acceptable pre-
payment mechanism for the informal sector including
non-contributory financing, a benefit package that is
affordable and aligned to the health needs of the popula-
tion, and accountability measures that punish corruption
would go a long way in expanding population coverage
and attainment of UHC in Kenya.
Application of research evidence
The evidence from this study has been presented to the
Government of Kenya through the Ministry of Health
(MoH) in various fora. The findings are also summarized
into policy briefs to be shared with all health sector
stakeholders in Kenya.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Questionnaire. Data here is exclusively quantitative.
The statistics involved are descriptive. (DOCX 136 kb)
Additional file 2: FGD. Data here is qualitative and involves discussions
around the various ways to prepay for health care. (DOCX 17 kb)
Additional file 3: In-depth interviews. This includes individual key
informant views on various ways to prepay for health care. [These
tools were meant for a larger study from which this manuscript has
been derived]. (DOCX 16 kb)
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